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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PARK CITY UTAH CORPORATJON,
a corporation, and CITY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a
corporation,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

No. 15410

ENSIGN COMPANY, a limited
partnership,
Defendant-Appellant.

NATURE OF CASE
This case is here on appeal from a partial summary
judgment in the amount of $98,000 against the defendants,
including the defendant Ensign Company.
DISPOSITION BELOW
The Third District Court, Summit County, granted
plaintiffs-respondents' motion for partial summary judgment
in the sum of $98,000 on September 6, 1977.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant, Ensign Company, seeks a
reversal of the partial summary judgment entered below and
a remand to the trial court for trial and resolution of
disputed issues of fact.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This case is yet another volume in the saga
involving the Park West ski resort, with which this Court is
all too familiar.*

It began in a straightforward manner in

early 1971 with the filing of a complaint seeking partition
of real estate in the Park West resort area, and seeking
only such a partition.**
Park West was conceived by Robert Major and
Robert Ensign who in January 1967 entered into a contract by
which they agreed to acquire land and develop and operate it
as a resort, with Major to provide certain services and
leaseholds and Ensign to pay for the land acquired.
was to receive one-half of all land acquired.

Major

Subsequently,

Major's interests were acquired by plaintiffs and Ensign's
interests were acquired by defendants.
As of 1971 sizeable tracts of land were either
being acquired or had been acquired· from various parties.
Much of the land was being acquired under executory real
estate contracts.

(See, e.g., R. 499, 508, 524-525, 530.)

*

Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 29 Utah 2d 184, 506
P.2d 1274 (1973); Ski Park West, Inc. v. Major-Blakeney
Corp., 30 Utah 2d 371, 517 P.2d 1325 (1974); Downey
state Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah
1976); Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 548 P.2d 889
(Utah 1976); Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp.,
556 P. 2d 1273 (Utah 1976).

**

Because of the undue size of the record, appellant
furnishes herewith a separate appendix containing the
material portions thereof.

- 2 -
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However, at least one parcel, acquired from one Nielsen,
was purchased by Major-Blakeney Corp.,*

(see, Downey State

Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 508(Utah1976)
which gave back a purchase money mortgage (R. 534, App. soi.
thereafter assigned to

Dow~ey

State Bank (R. 534, App.

50~.

This appeal only involves the rights, if any, of the partieo
following the foreclosure by Downey

Stab~

Bank** of the

mortgage as to a portion of the land originally included
within the mortgage.
The complaint, filed in February 1971, 2lleged

~

:-anuary 1967 agreement (R. 8-18, App. 6-25) between Major ar.
Ensign which called upon Ensign to buy certain property and
to allocate one-half of what was bought to Major.

As

alleged by the complaint, a dispute had arisen between the
parties concerning this property division and the

complai~

prayed, and only prayed, that the property rights of the
parties be determined (R. 3-7, App. 1-5, see especially P.
7, App. 5).
On May 21, 1971, the district court (Harding, J,),
upon stipulation, entered an order partitioning a substantial portion of the land within the resort (R. 164-167, App.
25-28).

On July 23, 1971, counsel for the parties execut~

*

Major-Blakeney Corp. was, along with the named plaintiff
a corporation controlled by Robert Major and/or Jose~
Krofcheck.
Its interest was assigned to plaintiffs.

**

See Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.~
507 (Utah 1976).
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a stipulation agreeing to a partition of the remaining land
(R. 203-207

I

App. 29-32).

The July 23, 1971 stipulation further provided
that with respect to certain parcels "being acquired" by the
parties under "executory real estate contracts" and in turn
"being sold to third party purchasers," that, "for the
protection of the existing original sellers and third party
purchasers," the defendants would "apply third party purchaser
proceeds to original seller obligations" to the extent they
were "not heretofore assigned."
Based upon that stipulation the district court
executed, also on July 23, 1971, a "Judgment on Stipulation"

(R. 208-214, App. 32-35).

Both the Stipulation and

the Judgment were prepared by plaintiffs' counsel (R. 749,
App. 54) on plaintiffs' counsel's letterhead.

The relevant

portions of the Stipulation read as follows:
8.
That the parties hereto recognize that
there are presently several executory real estate
contracts involved in the Park City West project
wherein property is being acquired for the project
from original sellers and certain properties within
these original acquisitions are being sold to third
party purchasers. With respect to these transactions,
it is hereby agreed and stipulated as follows:
A. That for the protection of the
existing original sellers and third party purchasers
the defendants shall without restriction or limitation,
except as herein provided, apply third party purchaser
proceeds to original seller obligations.
B. On receipt of third party proceeds
not heretofore assigned* and pending disbursements

*

Inserted by hand in the original.
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thereof to original seller obligatio1,s, the defendanb
shall deposit said proceeds in a separate trust acco~
the establishment, terms and conditions of withdrawal
therefrom to be subject to the approval of plaintiff.
It is the intent hereof that said proceeds are to be
segregated from the general funds, accounts and
expenditures of defendants and applied only to origi~
seller obligations, and are to be received and held~
trust by the defendants to insure performance of the
obligations to original sellers.

* * *
The July 23rd Judgment reads, in relevant part:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that for the protectior
of the existing original sellers and third party
purchasers the defendants shall without restriction or
limitation, except as herein provided, apply third
party purchaser proceeds to original seller obligat~m
A. On receipt of third party proceeds
not heretofore assigned* and pending disbursements
thereof to original seller obligations, the defendants
shall deposit said proceeds in a separate trust acco~
the establishment, terms and conditions of withdrawal
therefrom to be subject to the approval of plaintiff.
It is the intent hereof that said proceeds are to be
segregated from the general funds, acc0unts and expe~
ditures of defendants and applied only to original
seller obligations, and are to be received and held~
trust by the defendants to insure performance of the
obligations to original sellers.

* * *
It should be noted that despite the crucial
importance of the status of "executory real estate

contra~

"existing original sellers," "third party purchaser proceed:
and whether they had been "heretofore assigned" neither the
Stipulation nor the Judgment set forth in generality or
detail what qexecutory real estate contracts" there were,

*

Inserted by hand in the original.
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who the ''existing original sellers" were, what "third party
purchaser proceeds" there were and to what extent they had
been "heretofore assigned."
This Stipulation and Judgment were entered on the
record without the knowledge or consent of Ensign Company or
Robert Ensign, the sole general partner elf defendant-appellant
(R. 813-815, App. 65-67).

Indeed prior to the entry of the

Stipulation and Judgment, Ensign Company and Ensign had
assigned all of their interest to the other defendants and
were no longer in management of the project (R. 814, App. 66).
In June 1974, the plaintiffs set in motion various
proceedings which ultimately resulted in the judgment from
which defendant now appeals.

The first step was to obtain,

ex parte, an order to show cause (R. 389, App. 36).

Upon

hearing the district judge refused to cite defendanLs for
contempt and otherwise continued the matter without date (R.
401).

The matter was heard again on October 23, 1974, and

the district court (Harding, J.) held that while it appeared
that obligations due to sellers of the land had not in some
cases been paid, plaintiffs had failed to show that defendants
had received any third party purchaser proceeds which should
have been applied to such obligations, or that such proceeds
had been diverted.

The district court also declined to

enforce the underlying January 1967 agreement because "the
provisions of those documents have not been incorporated in
toto in the order or judgment in this cause, and are not now

-

6 -
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before the court for consideration."
cause was dismissed

The order to show

(R. 404-405, App. 37-39).

The matter was heard again on February 27, 1975
plaintiffs' motion

(R. 601, App.

53)

to enforce the

~

Stipu~

and Judgment (in support of which plaintiffs filed a 158
page affidavit, R.

441-598).

At this time Dr . .:Yoseph Krofc

claimed an interest as assignee of plaintiffs.

Following

this hearing the plaintiffs mysteriously obtained an "order'
of April 8, 1975, without prior notice to defendants, and
not received by defendants until May 16, 1975
62).

(R. 808, App.

For unexplained reasons the original April 8, 1975

"order" is not in the record.

Based upon that so-called

"order" plaintiff obtained, also ex parte, a writ of execution against the defendants in the sum of $73,653.53 (R.
426-427).

No money judgment had then been entered.
The~

parte April 8, 1975 "order," upon which

plaintiffs obtained their execution, in relevant part reads:
Plaintiffs' motion . . . having come on for
hearing . . . on February 27 .
and 28, 1975 . . .
and the court . . . having determined . . . it [is] the
duty of the defendants to pay and discharge the purchas
money obligations on the land divided to plaintiff . ·
., some of which obligations are now in default; now,
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within 14 days from
February 27, 1975 . . . the defendants shall certify~
writing . . . the amounts of principal and interest · ·
. currently due . . . upon original purchase money .
obligations encompassing land divided to said plaint1fi
. . . sufficient to obtain releases of property to sa~
plaintiff . . . ,
that plaintiffs' motion for leave to execuUi
be, and the same is hereby, granted as to the amounts
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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herein referred to sufficient to discharge outstanding
purchase money obligations . . . ,
that should defendants fail to so provide the
said balances currently due . . . or should there be a
valid, verified difference between such balances, to
that extent the balances certified to by the original
purchase money obligees shall be taken as the correct
amounts.
(R. 800-801, App. 59-60)
Defendants' counsel, when they learned of the socalled April 8 "order" irrunediately sought to have the court
vacate it and the writ of execution (R. 428-438, App. 3947).

They were unsuccessful (R. 766, App. 54-55).
The first time defendant-appellant received notice

of the above-mentioned proceedings was when Robert Ensign
was served in California with a notice of sister state
judgment in the amount of $73,653.53 en September 28, 1976
(R. 814-815, App. 67).

Not only is Ensign Co. named as a

defendant in this sister state judgment but also, for the
first time, is Robert Ensign himself (R. 786, App. 58).
As an attachment to defendant-appellant's motion for
relief, appending the California filing, the April 8, 1975
"order," as a xerox copy, first appears in the record (R.
800-801, App. 59-60).
The April 8, 1975 "order" is a curious document.
It did not find that defendants were justly indebted to
plaintiffs in a sum certain and it does not enter judgment
for such sum.

Instead, the "order" found that defendants

had the obligation to discharge purchase money obligations
encompassing the lands earlier divided to plaintiffs, and

- 8 -
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gave permission to plaintiffs to execute in such amount.

!'

is these two provisions of the "order" that colored all
subsequent proceedings in the case.

Each judge who dealt

with the case thereafter felt bound by the terms of the
"order."
This "order," prepared by plaintiffs' counsel,
makes no attempt to deal with important terms of the July
23, 1971 Stipulation and Judgment such as "existing original
sellers," "executory real estate contracts" or "receipt of
third party proceeds not heretofore assigned."
More importantly, the transcripts of the Februaey
27 and 28, 1975 hearings recited in the "order" provide no
basis for the "order."

The district court's rulings as

reflected by those transcripts were that plaintiffs were
free to file a motion for a dollar judgment (Tr. of 2-27-75
at 57-58), the court having earlier in the hearing
to consider plaintiffs' affidavit because it was

refus~

hearsay~

incompetent (Tr. of 2-27-75 at 10, 11).
Despite the fact that the April 8 "order" was

n~

a money judgment, and despite the failure of defendants to
produce certificates of amounts due on purchase money obligations, and the absence of any certificates from original
sellers as to amounts due, plaintiffs, ignoring the terms oi
their own ex parte "order," obtained an execution in the sur
of $73,653.53

(R. 426-427).

- 9 -
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In response to various motions of appellant
attacking the April 8, 1975 "order," the district court
(Leary, J.) decided on June 21, 1977 to refuse to vacate
the April 8, 1975 "order," but required a hearing on notice
as to the amount of any money judgment and restrained the
issuance of writs of execution (R. 883-887, App. 67-72).
Plaintiffs and Krofcheck thereafter filed a motion for
partial summary judgment (R. 919-920, App. 73-75), which
motion applied solely to the Major-Blakeney land foreclosed
under the Downey State Bank mortgage, and ultimately sold
at sheriff's sale.
The factual record made by plaintiffs in support
of their motion was only that the land had been sold at a
foreclosure sale and that it cost plaintiffs $98,000 to
acquire it from the foreclosure sale purchasers (Krofcheck
affidavit, R.

921-923, App. 75-77).

The record is barren

of any suggestion that there were any proceeds from "third
party purchasers" of this land, or, if so, that they had
not been "heretofore assigned," or that if received by defendants that they were misapplied.

Indeed the record suggests

that this land was not the subject of an executory real estate
contract (R. 534, App. 50A), and was never the subject of
sales to third parties by the defendants.

Plaintiffs'

- 10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

earlier affidavit itself, which purports to show all third
party purchasers, demonstrates that none of this land was
sold to "third party purchasers."*

It also shows that the

largest parcel included in the July 23, 1971 Stipulated
Judgment, the land acquired from Taylor Lott, was sold to
one Gaskin, on a real estate contract, and that the contnct
was assigned by the parties before the Stipulated Judgment
was entered (R. 559-560, App. 51-52).

This contract, by

plaintiff's own showing, was 43 percent in amount of all
"third party purchaser" contracts (R. 461, App. 47-48).
record further reflects that Ensign Co. and Ensign have

T~
h~

no dealings with this land and have collected no monies
relating to it since long before the Stipulation and Judgmen
(R. 954-955, App. 78-79).
Nevertheless, the district court (Sawaya, J.)
entered partial summary judgment for $98, 000 against defen·
dants on September 6, 1977 (R. 1016-1018, App. 79-82).

It

is from this judgment and the prior interlocutory order
leading up to it that appellant now seeks relief.

*

Major in his affidavit identified all third party pu~
chaser contracts (R. 448).
It is apparent from those
contracts that none of them involve the Major-Blaken~
land (R. 570-597).
Plaintiffs, of course, never
attempted to show that there were third party purchaser:
of the Major-Blakeney land.

-

11 -
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ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT IS NOT BOUND BY THE JULY 23, 1971 STIPULATION
AND JUDGMENT BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS NOT A PARTY TO AND
HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE STIPULATION.
The April 8, 1975 "order" and September 6, 1977

partial summary judgment from which defendant now appeal
rest upon and purport to enforce the July 23, 1971 Stipulation and Judgment.

Although the defendants' attorney signed

the stipulation and acquiesced in the judgment, the appellant
had not authorized its

~ttorney

to do so, and, indeed, had

no knowledge of what was being done.
why this occurred.

The record reflects

Robert Ensign had very early on assigned

his individual interest to Ensign Company, a limited partnership.

Ensign Company thereafter assigned its interest to Ski

Park City West in exchange for stock in that corporation (R.
812-813, App.

64-65).

By the end of June 1971, Ensign Company

had exchanged its stock in Ski Park City West for stock in
Life Resources, Inc., which then assumed management of the
project in place of Ensign (R. 814, App. 66).

Thus by

July 23, 1971, Ensign Company, was to all appearances out of
the litigation and the failure to keep it notified of developments becomes understandable.

When derendant-appellant

learned of the Stipulation and Judgment, it took immediate
steps toward overturning them.

Courts widely observe the

common law rule that the attorney does not have
implied authority to waive the substantative
rights of the party by the compromise settlement
agreement.

- 12 -
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Grossman v. Will, 10 Wash. App. 141, 516 P.2d 1063, 1069
(1973).
In Radosevich v. Pegues, 133 Colo. 148, 292 P.2d
741 (1956), the Colorado Supreme Court applied this rule

a~

reversed a judgment based upon a stipulation of counsel of
which the c 1 ien t had no knowledge.

The court observed that

(t]he general rule is that an attorney may not
compromise his client's case without express
authority.
Id. 292 P.2d at 743.

The court found the judgment entered

in accordance with the unauthorized stipulation to be no
barrier to reopening the case, and summarily overturned it.
Accord,~.,

P.2d 244

Bice v. Stevens, 160 Cal. App. 2d 222, 325

(1958); Robinson v. Hiles, 119 Cal. App. 2d 666,

260 P.2d 194 (1953); Coon v. Ginsberg, 32 Colo. App. 206,
509 P.2d 1293 (1973); Muncey v. Children's Home Finding &
Aid Soc., 84 Idaho 14 7, 369 P. 2d 586

(1962); National Valve

& Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 205 Okla. 571, 240 P.2d 766 (1951);
Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 945

(1953).

This Court has recognized that an attorney may
not, without authorization, compromise his client's claims.
In Rackham v. Rackham, 119 Utah 593, 230 P.2d 566 (1951),
this Court said
[we agree] that an attorney has no authority to
enter into a stipulation relative to substantial
rights of his client without his client's conse~

-

13 -
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Id. 230 P.2d at 570.

Although this Court's statement in

Rackham is dicta because in that case the client was present
in court when her attorney made the stipulation and failed
to object, it leaves no

do~bt

that had the client not

acquiesced in the stipulation, she would not have been bound
by it.

This Court has thus approved the rule that a Califor-

nia court has called "almost universal."

Bice v. Stevens,

160 Cal. App. 2d 222, 325 P. 2d 244, 250 (1958).
The Washington Court of Appeals has recently
articulated the due process foundation of the rule.

An

attorney must have implied authority to enter into stipulations and waivers concerning procedural matters or our legal
system would collapse from inefficiency.

But a client has a

due process right guaranteed by the United States and Utah
constitutions, U. S. Const. Amend. 14, Utah Const. Art. I,

§

7, to his day in court when substantial rights are at stake.
An attorney "has no authority to waive any substantial
rights of his client."
P.2d 1276, 1279 (1972).

In re Houts, 7 Wash. App. 476, 499
The rule that an unauthorized

settlement entered into by an attorney will not be enforced
is a corollary of the client's due process right to have
substantial claims determined in court if he desires.

The

mere employment of an attorney will not be taken as a waiver
of that right.
Because the defendant-appellant in the case before
this Court had no knowledge of the unauthorized stipulation

- 14 -
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affecting substantial rights of its entered into by its
attorney, the lower court erred in issuing an order and
partial surrunary judgment based upon the Stipulation and
accompanying Judgment.

This denial of defendant' s-appellan·

due process rights alone is sufficient ground for this Com·
to vacate the order and partial summary judgment below.

At

the very least, the question of whether the defendantappellant authorized its attorney to execute the stipulatior
is an unresolved question of fact which should have barred
the entry of a partial summary judgment.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ENTERING ,;,, SUMMARY JUDGMEN!
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS WHEN THE RECORD FAILED TO SHOW
THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW, AND WHERE CRUCIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXISTED.
A.

This Court Has Repeatedly Stressed The Fundamentai
Rule That Any Material Issue of Fact Is An AbsoM
Bar To summary Judgment.
The district court, in granting plaintiffs' motior

for partial surrunary judgment, ignored the stringent standarc
imposed by Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
this Court's interpretation of that rule.

Rule 56(c) pro-

vides in pertinent part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there are no genuine issues as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
(Emphasis supplied.)

- 15 -
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This rule, by its literal terms, places on the moving party
the great burden of demonstrating the absence of any material
issues of fact.

Wright & Miller in their treatise neatly

summarize the difficulty moving parties have in meeting this
"burden of demonstrating".
It is well-settled that the party moving for
summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that the Rule 56(c) test - "no genuine
issue as to any material fact" - is satisfied
and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The movant is held to a stringent
standard. Before summary judgment will be
granted, it must be clear what the truth is
and any doubt as to the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact will be resolved against
the movant. The burden is on the movant, the
evidence presented to the court always is construed in favor of the party opposing the motion
and he is given the benefit of all favorable
inferences that can be drawn from it. Finally,
the facts asserted by the party opposing the
motion, if supported by affidavits or other
evidentiary material, are regarded to be true.
(Emphasis supplied.)
10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure:
2727 at 524-30

Civil,

(1973) and authorities cited therein.

§

This

Court has repeatedly expressed similar, if not identical,
sentiments regarding the caution with which the district
courts should approach the summary judgment procedure.

For

example, in Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty
Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965),
the Court held:
The summary disposal of a case serves a salutary
purpose in avoiding the time, trouble and expense
of a trial when it is justified. But unless it
is clearly so, there are other evils to be
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guarded against.
A party with a legitimate cause
but who is unable to afford an appeal, may be
'
turned away without his day in court; or when an
appeal is taken, if a reversal results and a
trial is ordered, the time, trouble and expense
is increased rather than diminished.
It is to
avoid these evils and to safeguard the right of
access to the courts for the enforcement of
rights and the remedy of wrongs by a trial, and
by a jury if desired, that it is of such importance that the court should take care to see that
the party adversely affected has a fair opportunity to present his contentions against precipi·
tate action which will deprive him of that privi·
lege.
398 P.2d at 688.

Accord, Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266

(Utah 1976); Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d
350, 353 P.2d 460

(1960).

Furthermore, the cases in this state are legion
that echo the following statement from Bullock v. Deseret
Dodge Truck Centers, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559, 561
(1960):
A summary judgment must be supported by evide::ce,
admissions and inferences which, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the loser shows that;
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
Such showing must preclude
all reasonable possibility that the loser could,
if given a trial, produce evidence which would
reasonably sustain a judgment in hi~ favor.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396, 397 (1963)
(summary judgment a "harsh remedy"; should be granted only
when viewing evidence in light most favorable to non-moving
party "it is evident beyond a reasonable possibility that i'
given a trial he could not produce evidence to sustain a

- 17 -
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judgment more favorable to him."); Russell v. Park City
Utah Corp., 29 Utah 2d 184, 506 P.2d 1274 (1973); Christensen
v. Financial Service Co., 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010
(1963); Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d
266

(1962); Green v. Garn, 11 Utah 2d 375, 359 P.2d 1050

(1961).
In light of these cases, it is clear that a court
must be very circumspect in granting a summary judgment
against a party, especially when the losing party has
asserted factual matters that contravene the assertion of
the other party and, if true, would alter the outcome of the
case.
The record as made below not only reveals the
existence of material controverted issues of fact, it also
reveals that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
B.

The Judgment Below Resulted From An Erroneous Interpretation of the Stipulation and Judgment of July 23,
1971.
In entering the partial summary judgment against

appellant, the court below adopted plaintiffs' theory that
the Stipulation and Judgment of July 23, 1971 imposed upon
defendants the duty in all events to pay for the land divided
to plaintiffs. This theory, long urged by plaintiffs, first
crept into the court's rulings by way of the ~ parte "order"
of April 8, 1975, and thereafter became a fixture in each
subsequent ruling of the district court.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Once the ex parte "order" of April 8, 1975 interpreted the July 23, 1971 Stipulation and Judgment as
authorizing a judgment for money damages, each district

judge felt unable to depart from that interpretation withou
overruling a fellow district judge.

Accordingly, Judge

Sawaya entered partial summary judgment against the defendants, thus permitting appellant to seek reversal of the
erroneous interpretation made below.
This Court must now decide whether the district
court's interpretation of the July 23, 1971 Stipulation and
Judgment authorizing an award of money damages was correct
or erroneous.

The record compels the conclusion that the

district court's interpretation was erroneous.
1.

The lower court failed to observe the
settled rules that a stipulated judgment
should be strictly construed and that it
should be construed against the party
who drafted it.

The April 8, 1975 "order" and the partial summary
judgment authorizing an award of money damages against the
defendant-appellant rely on and purport to construe the
stipulated judgment of July 23, 1971.

The construction of

the Stipulated Judgment as authorizing an award of money
damages, however, is wholly without support from the record
and violates settled rules governing the construction of
stipulated judgments.
When a party stipulates to a judgment he waives
his right to have his claims and defenses adjudicated,

- 19 -
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and usually, as in the present case, agrees to a compromise.
Because the Stipulated Judgment issues solely upon a stipulation and does not involve adjudication on the merits, the
judgment must be strictly construed to ensure that it is not
used to bind a party to more than he, by stipulation, agreed.
American Radium Co. v. Hipp. Didisheim Co., 279 F. 601, 603
(S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd, 279 F. 1016 (2d Cir. 1922).

As the

Tenth Circuit has said, when a judge enters a stipulated
judgment, he "merely [exercises] an administrative function
in recording what [has] been agreed to between the parties."
Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Gilmore, 167 F.2d 324, 330 (10th
Cir. 1948).

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated this rule

even more forcefully:
Courts are entirely without authority to enter
any judgment by agreement other than a judgment
falling strictly within the stipulation of the
parties.
Insurance Service Co. v. Finegan, 196 Okla. 441, 165 P.2d
620 (1946).
When the lower court construed the Stipulated
Judgment to authorize an award of money damages against the
defendant-appellant, it violated the rule that stipulated
judgments should be narrowly construed to fall within the
stipulation.

Nothing in the terms of the Stipulation itself

or in the record indicates that the defendant-appellant
agreed to have a money judgment entered against it.
the Stipulation never mentions money damages.

Indeed,

The lower

court clearly exceeded its authority when it construed the
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Stipulated Judgment broadly as authorizing an award for

m~

damages when the Stipulation does not even hint that the
defendant-appellant agreed to a money damage judgment.
The United States Supreme Court has recently
applied the rule that a consent judgment must be strictly
construed.

In rejecting the government's effort to impose,

broad construction upon a consent decree, the court noted
the rule's due process basis:
For these reasons, the scope of a consent
decree must be discerned within its four
corners, and not by reference to what might
satisfy the purposes of one of the parties
to it.
Because the defendant has, by the
decree, waived his right to litigate the
issues raised, a right guaranteed to him by
the Due Process Clause, the conditions upon
which he has given that waiver must be
respected, and the instrument must be construed as it is written, and not as it
might have been written had the plaintiff
established his factual claims and legal
theories in litigation.
United States v. Armour

&

Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971).

A,

in Armour, the appellant in the case at bar waived* its due
process right to litigate the claims against it and agreed
to a Judgment to terminate the proceedings.

The Judgment

must therefore be strictly construed -- "the conditions upo:
which he gave that waiver must be respected .

.

"

Id.

Th~

broad construction that the lower court applied violated
this rule and compromised the appellant's due process right

*

If it is bound by its attorney's conduct, see Point Ii
supra.
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The plaintiffs' contention that the defendant-appellant
stipulated to have a money

judg~ent

entered against it

finds support only in the broadest, most strained construction
of the Stipulation and Judgment.

The lower court erred when

it made such a construction.
Another rule of construction of a stipulated
judgment is also widely accepted -- that it should be construed as a contract:
It is true, as pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, that a stipulated judgment is not
considered to be a judicial determination;
"rather it is a contract between the
parties," State v. Clark, 79 N.M. 29, 439
P.2d 547 I 549 (1968)
Owen v. Burn Const. Co., 90 N.M. 297, 563 P.2d 91, 93
(1977).

Accord, Ex parte Ferrigno, 22 Cal. App. 2d 472,

71 P.2d 329, 330 (1937); Greeson v. Greeson, 208 Okla. 457,
257 P.2d 276, 278

(1953); Insurance Service Co. v. Finegan,

~

196 Okla. 441, 165 P.2d 620 (1946); Grayson v. Pure Oil Co.,

~

189 Okla. 550, 118 P.2d 644, 648 (1941); Washington Asphalt

10:

;h<

~

Co. v. Harold Kaeser Co., 51 Wash. 2d 89, 316 P.2d 126, 127
(1957); 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments

§

1082 at 140 (1969).

Like any other contract, the Stipulation and
Judgment should be read to determine if their meaning can
be ascertained.

If the language is clear and unambiguous,

the intent of the parties must be ascertained from the
language and terms of the agreement.
Co., supra.

Owen v. Burn Const.

If the language is unclear or ambiguous the
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judgment may be read in light of the record if the record
gives it meaning, Snow v. West, 37 Utah 528, 110 P. 52
(1910), and the familiar rule for the interpretation of
contracts that they are to be construed against the draftk
party should be applied.

See Bryant v. Deseret News Pub.

120 Utah 241, 233 P.2d 355 (1951).

c

Nothing in the record

reveals that by the language used in the Stipulated Judgrnen'
the appellant agreed to the entry of a money judgment
against it.

And when the language of the Stipulation and

Judgment is construed against the plaintiffs-respondents,
whose attorneys drafted it, the construction that the lower
court adopted is obviously erroneous.
Because of these numerous errors in construing
the Stipulated Judgment and the concomitant invasion of
the defendant's due process rights, the lower court's
April 8, 1975 "order" and the partial summary judgment
following it must be reversed.

Appellant in what follows

will demonstrate how the court below should have construed
the Judgment of July 23, 1971 in light of the principles
governing the construction of such documents.
2.

The Judgment of July 23, 1971 applied only
to that land which was covered by executon:
real estate contracts, and the evidence
shows that the land in question was not
so covered.

This Court's duty as set forth, supra, is to
interpret the July 23, 1971 Stipulated Judgment from within
its four corners if possible, and if not then in light of
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the record as made at the time it was entered.

The Judgment

standing alone is ambiguous as to what land it concerns.

It

reads, in relevant part, "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that for
the protection of the existing original sellers .
defendants shall .

.

• . the

. apply third party purchaser proceeds

to original seller obligations"

(emphasis supplied).

The Court will note that "existing original
sellers" and "original seller obligations" are indefinite.
Nowhere in the Judgment are these phrases defined.

Thus the

four corners of the Judgment are insufficient to interpret
it.

The Court would be in the dark as to the intent of the

parties and the district court in using these ambiguous
words if i t were not for the Stipulation of the same date.
That Stipulation, while not a model of clarity and precision,
casts revealing light.
The Stipulation, in relevant part, reads:
That the parties hereto recognize that there
are presently several executory real estate
contracts . • . wherein property is being acquired
for the project from original sellers and certain
properties within these original acquisitions are
being sold to third party purchasers. With
respect to these transactions, it is hereby agreed
and stipulated as follows:
A.
That for the protection of the existing
original sellers .
[etc., as in the Judgment].
One can easily see what happened.

The prefatory

language quoted above as found in the Stipulation did not
get repeated in the Judgment.

This language which appears

in the Stipulation (prepared and executed simultaneously
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with the Judgment) makes clear what the parties and the
court below* intended.
It must be remembered that the parties, plaintiff
and defendants, were assembling sizeable land holdings in
the Park West area.

Much of it they were in the process of

acquiring by executory real estate contracts from the
original landowners. Some had been acquired by deed.

As oi

the time of the Stipulation and Judgment of July 23, 1971,
the parties had, in turn, entered into contracts to sell
some portions of all this land to others, called third part:
purchasers by the parties.
The obligation to collect and apply proceeds

on~

affected those lands which the parties were in the process
of buying under an executory real

est~te

contract (and, of

course, where the parties had contracted with others to sel.
the same land, or a portion of it, and had not as signed tha•
contract).

For example if the plaintiffs had been the

"buyer" under an executory real estate contract of Blackacr:
from Mr. S and had in turn agreed with Mr. B, to sell Mr.

B

Blackacre (and had not assigned the contract with Mr. B)
then, and only then, would defendants, under the Stipulatio:
and Judgment, have the obligation to apply proceeds receivec
from Mr. B to the contract with Mr. S.

*

There is no indication that the court below declined W
enter judgment in the form presented to it by counsel.
Just the opposite, as both S tipula ti on and Judgment were
prepared by plaintiffs' counsel (and on his letterhead).
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But the obligation of defendants never could arise
unless indeed there had been in existence as of July 23,
1971, an executory real estate contract with respect to the
Major-Blakeney land which was foreclosed by Downey State
Bank.

Plaintiffs' submittals fail to show any such

executory real estate contract.

Rather, it appears that

Major-Blakeney purchased the land and executed a mortgage
deed.

There simply was no executory real estate contract.

Thus, by the very terms of the Stipulation and Judgment no
obligation was imposed on defendants to collect and apply
proceeds respecting that land.
The court below failed to apply the terms of the
Stipulation and Judgment of July 23, 1971 when it entered
partial summary judgment against appellant.

The district

court fell into this error because it felt bound by the
April 8, 1975 ex parte "order," which "order" applied
plaintiffs' interpretation, an interpretation erroneous
because it fails to take into consideration the language of
the Stipulation and Judgment.
3.

The Judgment of July 23, 1971 applied only
to that land from which there were proceeds,
and the evidence fails to show that there
were any such proceeds as to the land in
question.

Both plaintiffs and the court below have misread
the Stipulation and Judgment in another respect.

That is,

they assumed that plaintiffs did not need to show the
existence of proceeds from third party sales contracts for
the Major-Blakeney land.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Stipulation and Judgment both recite that the
collection and application of proceeds obligation was

~

the protection of the existing original sellers and third
party purchasers."

The only way both original seller and

third party purchaser could be protected was, to elaborate
on the example given above, to use the proceeds from Mr. B,
who was buying Blackacre from the parties, to reduce the
indebtedness to Mr. S, who was selling Blackacre to the
parties.

If, for instance, Mr. B's payments were used to

pay Mr. X for Whi teacre, neither Mr . B nor Mr . S would be
protected, but would be prejudiced instead.
It follows that if there were no third party
purchasers of the Major-Blakeney land (putting aside, for
argument, the distinction between a mortgage and an executory real estate contract) , then defendant-appellant had no
duty under the Stipulation and Judgment to apply any proceeds to the Major-Blakeney land.

In this respect plain-

tiffs-respondents have failed to meet a major burden impose(
by Rule 56 (c) .

Plaintiffs-respondents nowhere in the recorc

established that there were any such third party purchasers
of the Major-Blakeney land.

Quite the contrary.

The recorc

made by Major shows affirmatively that all of the third
party purchase contracts dealt with land other than the
Major-Blakeney land foreclosed by the bank (R. 448, 570-591
Thus it was error for the district court to enter
judgment against defendants for $98,000, as plaintiffs'
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1

proof in support of this figure showed only that this was
the sum plaintiffs paid to acquire that portion of the
Major-Blakeney land which was foreclosed by the bank.

Under

plaintiffs'-respondents' own proof no duty arose as to this
land as no

procee~s

were available to be applied upon it.

For this reason alone the Court should reverse the partial
suI!UTiary judgment.
4.

The Judgment of July 23, 1971 applied only
to the extent that proceeds had not been
"heretofore assigned" and there is an
unresolved question of fact whether the
proceeds had been "heretofore assigned."
The judgment against defendants for

$98,000 was erroneously entered for yet another reason.
Plaintiffs-respondents failed to adduce any evidence that
defendants received any third party proceeds which had not
been "heretofore assigned."

All that plaintiffs'-respondents'

factual submissions, including the Major affidavit, demonstrate is that there were a half dozen or so contracts
outstanding to third party purchasers relating to land other
than that foreclosed by the bank.

These factual submissions

purport to show only what was payable, not what was in fact
paid by those purchasers.

The duty to apply funds arises by

the terms of the Stipulation and Judgment only to proceeds,
that is money actually received by defendants.

While it may

well have been the case that there were over $660,000 in
payables there is no hint in the record as to what was
actually received by defendants.

- 28 -

The Stipulation and Judgment
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say defendants "shall . . . apply third party purchaser
proceeds;" that "in receipt of third party proceeds . .
said proceeds are to be segregated .
original seller obligations."

. . and applied only to

Plaintiffs'-respondents'

factual submissions fail to show what was received by
defendant-appellant.

Defendant-appellant's affidavit shows

that it never received any such proceeds (R. 954-955, App. 7
Thus, at the very least there must be a trial of this disputed issue of fact -- were any proceeds received.
Furthermore if the proceeds had been "heretofore
assigned" then by the express terms of the Stipulation and
Judgment no duty arose.

Plaintiffs'-respondents' own affi-

davit shows affirmatively that the land being acquired from
a Taylor Lott by executory real estate contract was in

lar~

part being resold by the parties to one Reed Gaskin for
$288,000, or 43% of all the third party purchaser payables.
Major's affidavit also shows that the Gaskin contract was
"heretofore assigned"

(R. 559-560, App.

51-52).

Thus

there was never available to the defendant-appellant a
major portion of the receivables.
In effect, plaintiffs' argument below was, and
must be now, that unavailability of proceeds is no excuse.
To reach this result plaintiffs-respondents not only ignore
the plain language of the Stipulation and Judgment, which
impose a duty only with respect to proceeds -- not accounU
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receivable -- but they strain entirely out of shape other
portions of the Stipulation and Judgment.
For instance plaintiffs-respondents have consistently asserted below that paragraph B of the Judgment
imposes a duty to pay off all encumbrances in all events.
It clearly does not.

It only provides,"In the event of

default by a third party purchaser, the property shall be
resold and the proceeds thereof applied to any outstanding
original seller obligation . . . . "

If upon default and

resale there is a deficiency, then and only then shall the
deficiency be the obligation of defendant-appellant.
Plaintiffs-respondents have utterly failed to show any
default of either a contract respecting the Major-Blakeney
land, or of a contract "not heretofore assigned."

Not only

is no default shown, but neither is any resale or any
deficiency upon such resale.

Thus paragraph B cannot support

the summary judgment because of plaintiffs'-respondents'
failure to prove any of the elements necessary to be proved
under its language.
III.

THE APRIL 8, 1975 "ORDER" WAS BOTH WITHOUT WARRANT
FROM THE RECORD AND A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.
The April 8, 1975 "order," was obtained by plain-

tiffs-respondents, ex parte, following hearings on February
27 and 28, 1975.

This so-called "order" tainted all subse-

quent proceedings in one very important respect.

The

"order'' in effect substituted plaintiffs'-respondents'

-
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erroneous theory (that all they need show was that amounts
were due on purchase money obligations to the original
sellers to the parties)
lation and Judgment.

in place of the terms of the Stipu-

The "order" thus precluded all distric

judges who later heard this matter from examining the underlying issues of what lands were covered by executory real
estate contracts, what third party purchase proceeds were
received by defendant-appellant, which of those proceeds had
theretofore been assigned, and the manner in which the
proceeds, if any, were applied.*
A.

The April 8, 1975 "Order" Is Not Supported By
The Record And Was Therefore Erroneous.
The April 8, 1975 "order" came into being because

plaintiffs'-respondents' first attempt to raise the issue of
defendants' purported failure to obey the Stipulation and
Judgment, by way of an order to show cause, was resoundingly
rebuffed by the district court (R. 404-405, App. 37-39).
Plaintiffs-respondents then filed a motion to enforce the
Judgment of July 23, 1971 (R. 601, App. 53)
the massive Major affidavit (R. 441-598) .

supported by
The matter then

came on for hearing on February 27, 1975, a transcript of
which has been included in the record on appeal.
*

It is interesting to note that if the April 8 "order"
measure of damages was followed, plaintiffs' damages
should have been the amount, at most, of Downey State
Bank's foreclosure judgment, $37,744.22 (R. 433-434).
If the April 8 "order" is valid and binding, then the
partial summary judgment for $98,000 is clearly
erroneous as it is based upon the amount Krofcheck paid
to acquire the land following the sheriff's sale.
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At that hearing plaintiffs-respondents proposed to
show the dollar amounts required to have five parcels
released to them free and clear, relying upon various
documents attached to Major's affidavit (Tr. 4).

Defendants'

counsel correctly objected to their hearsay character and
irrelevance (Tr. 4-5).

Robert Major was called as a witness,

but his attempt to repeat on the witness stand the substance
of his affidavit was prevented by timely objection.

The

court correctly ruled that Major only had hearsay to offer
(Tr. 10).

Defendants at this time also raised the issue of

what payments had actually been made on third party purchaser
contracts and received by defendants (Tr. 11).

The district

judge repeatedly ruled that he had only hearsay and incompetent matter before him and that it would be error to rely
upon it (Tr. 10, 11).

The district judge then ruled that

what we will need to do, is to have the records
of those who are supposed to receive the monies
on these third party purchase contracts, the
records on them, and see what monies have been
received.
And if they haven't been collected
why they haven't been collected. And then
whatever has been collected, see how it has
been applied.
(Tr. 13.)
The court at this stage understood, as can be
seen, the legal significance of the receipt of third party
purchase obligations, and further suggested to plaintiffsrespondents' counsel that he use the discovery process to
learn the extent of those receipts (Tr. 14) and agreed that
plaintiffs-respondents were also entitled to discover what
defendants' records showed as remaining unpaid on purchase
- 32 -
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money obligations (Tr. 16).

The district judge then asked

how long it would take defendants' counsel to gather the twc
classes of information.
The Court: Consult with your clients and
tell me how much time you need .
.Mr. Cook [defendants' counsel] :
two weeks, your Honor?
The Court:

May we have

Yes, you may.

The Court: And you have given them your
figures that you claim are owing on them?
Mr. Strong:

Yes.

The Court:
They are going to check and see
whether or not they can admit those figures.
And if
they deny them, then they will give us the figures they
claim are the ones, if any, or whether they have been
paid (Tr. 17-18).
(It should be noted that earlier in this hearing
plaintiffs-respondents had set out the amounts they claimed
to be due on five parcels of real estate.

Among them was ar.

asserted payable to Downey State Bank of $28,600.

Tr. 14.)

The most that can be asserted from this record is
that the district court entered a discovery order, that
defendants were (a) to furnish the receipts records for the
third party purchaser contracts and (b)

to admit or deny

plaintiffs'-respondents' figures for amounts due from the
parties on purchase money obligations.

No sanctions

were incorporated into this order .
.Much later on in the hearing, after having discussed other unrelated matters and other lawsuits involving
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the same parties, the court turned again to this case,
commenting:
You entered into a stipulated judgment on
that matter, and that judgment should stand. Now,
they're [plaintiffs] going to come in with a motion for
a dollar judgment with respect to your failure to
perform under that judgment?
Mr. Strong:

Yes (Tr. 57).

Thus the matter rested at the conclusion of the hearing.
Plaintiffs-respondents were to obtain discovery and were
free to move for a dollar judgment again.
The attorneys and the court met again on February
28, 1975, and a transcript of that hearing is also part of
the record on appeal, even though it is captioned for
another civil action.

That hearing did not concern this

case in any fashion.
What warrant in this record was there for the
ex parte April 8, 1975 "order"?

What justification for

imposing upon defendants "the duty . . . to pay and discharge
the purchase money obligations on the land divided to plaintiff.

."?

What justification for the order that "within

14 days from" February 27, 1975,* "defendants shall certify
in writing .

. . the amounts of principal and interest . •

currently due and owing upon original purchase money obligations .
. ?"

*

[of]

. land divided to said plaintiff

Where in the record of proceedings prior to the

Remember, that date of this "order" was April 8, 1975,
nearly 40 days from February 27.

-
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"order" was plaintiff given "leave to execute . . . as to
the amounts herein referred to sufficient to discharge
outstanding purchase money obligations . . . "?
To ask these questions is to answer them.

The

record furnishes no justification, no warrant, for the
ex parte "order" of April 8, 1975.
B.

The "Order" of April 8, 1975 Deprived Appellant cl
Property Without Due Process.
The April 8, 1975 "order" obtained ex parte by

plaintiffs was first brought to defendant's counsel's atten·
tion on May 16, 1975 (R. 808, App. 62).

Despite various mot

seeking to vacate the "order," the April 8, 1975 "order" was
stubbornly clung to by every judge who thereafter heard the
matter, resulting in a uniform refusal to look behind the
"order" to the terms of the Stipulation and Judgment.

The

April 8, 1975 "order" thus became the "law of the case" and
the ultimate justification for the entry of the partial
summary judgment against appellant.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 5(a) and
77(d) incorporate the fundamental notion of due process
notice and hearing.

Thus Rule 5 (a) provides, "Except as

otherwise provided in these rules, every order required by
its terms to be served .
the parties .

.

. shall be served upon each of

Rule 77(d) in turn provides:

At the time of presenting any written order
.
. . . to the court for signing, the party seeking
such order
. shall deposit with the clerk
sufficient copies thereof for mailing as here-
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inafter required.
Irrunediately upon the entry
of an order . .
the clerk shall serve a notice
of entry by mail in the manner provided for
in Rule 5 upon each party . .
These explicit provisions were ignored to defendants'-appellant's detriment in this case.

Not only the

Rules but the Utah Constitution were ignored.

Utah consti-

tution, Article I, § 7, reads, "No person shall be deprived
of .

property, without due process of law."
This fundamental constitutional right has long

been held to require notice and hearing and an order or
judgment which is rendered upon the record thus made.
Many attempts have been made to further define
"due process" but they all resolve into the
thought that a party shall have his day in court
-- that is each party shall have a right to a
hearing before a competent court, with the
privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to establish his cause or his defense,
after which comes judgment upon the record
thus made.
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314, 316 (1945).
The Court has long held that ex parte orders
depriving a party of substantial rights are violative of the
due process clause.
Where a court has jurisdiction of a cause and of
the parties, there are undoubtedly various orders
which the court in the progress of the cause may
make without notice to the adverse party and be
of binding effect, in the absence of a motion or
notice to vacate or modify the order. But such
doctrine applies only to such orders as the court
has power to make without notice.
It does not
apply to a purported ex parte order whose effect
is to deprive a party of property without due
process of law .
Cox v. Dixie Power Co., 81 Utah 94, 16 P.2d 916, 920-921
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(1932).

See also, Hilton Bros. Motor Co. v. District Court
I

82 Utah 372, 25 P.2d 595 (1933);

Morris v. Public Service

Com'n, 7 Utah 2d 167, 321 P.2d 644, 646
Because the

~

(1958).

parte "order" of April 8, 1975 was

obtained in flagrant disregard of appellant's due process
rights, and because it is so utterly lacking in support froc
the record, this Court should reverse that "order."

Rever-

sal of that "order" also requires reversal of the partial
summary judgment because that partial summary judgment was
predicated upon that "order."
CONCLUSION
As shown above, reversal of the partial summary
judgment is required for three basic reasons.

First,

appellant is not bound by the Stipulation and Judgment
of July 23, 1971, that the partial summary judgment purport:
to enforce.

Secondly, and entirely independently of the

first ground, the district court so misconstrued the Stipu·
lation and Judgment of July 23, 1971 that it ignored
respondents' failure to meet its burdens imposed by Rule 56
of demonstrating a right to judgment upon uncontested facts.
Thirdly, and again entirely independently of any other grom
the partial summary judgment was predicated upon an "or d er
so erroneous and such an egregious affront to appellant's
due process rights that it should be reversed.
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ii

The Court should reverse the partial summary
judgment and the "order" of April 8, 1975 and remand the
matter to the district court for trial upon the factual
issues presented by appellant's lack of consent to the
Stipulation and Judgment of July 23, 1971, and upon the
factual issues posed by the terms of that Stipulation and
Judgment.
Respectfully submitted,

Warren Patten
Charles B. Casper
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellant
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